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BOOK REVIEW
THE RATIONING

OF JUSTICE:

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE CRIMINAL

PROCESS. By Arnold S. Trebach. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University
Press, 1964. 350 pages. $10.00.) - Most discussions of the administration of
justice in the United States appear either (a) to stress the deficiencies and neglect
the strengths, or (b) to insist upon the virtues and gloss over the defects of the
American legal structure. Consequently, it was an unexpected pleasure to find that
Trebach has produced a stimulating blend of factual analysis and workable ideas
for improving the machinery, without slipping into either iconoclasm or apologetics.
The author, as Administrator of the Defender Project of the National Legal Aid
and Defender Association, is passionately concerned with the problems of unequal
justice. However, his is a passion that does not strike out gallantly but blindly,
rather it gives life and drive to his collection, analysis, and interpretation of the
facts of life in the "constitutional underworld," where poverty, ignorance, and
impotence make meaningless officially guaranteed rights and immunities. An
overly brief review of pertinent legal and social science materials is combined with
some questionnaire and interview data from federal and state prisoners in New
Jersey and Pennsylvania, as well as impressions and examples from the writer's
experience, to document the extent of injustice in our system, to locate the points
at which the system is especially inadequate, and to indicate practical alternatives
to current arrangements.
The evidence indicates that ignorance of law, deliberate disregard of laws
and procedural rules, and a bias toward cheap and easy rather than thorough and
demanding methods for handling criminal cases raise the odds against the accused
at every stage in the legal process. Arrests without probable cause and often with
little chance of a conviction account for a very high proportion of total arrests,
giving many individuals an arrest record that may seriously affect their job opportunities and reputations. Illegal coercion in arrest and interrogation, illegal or
at least highly questionable searches and seizures, totalitarian invasions of privacy,
and illegal detention are not infrequent police practices. Delay, haste, and a failure
to appreciate the helpless confusion of the accused, who is usually without any
legal assistance, apparently characterize the preliminary hearing. Tremendous
pressure is exerted upon the accused to "cop out," thus saving the law enforcers and the accused, it should be noted - the trouble and expense of a major test
of the case. Since the "criminal court is pre-eminently an institution for the poor,"'
and since the indigent rarely receive legal assistance - competent or not - until
they have been arraigned, the accused is commonly lacking in knowledge of his
rights or of how to prepare a defense. Moreover, while the prosecution is preparing the case for guilt, the accused is frequently unable to raise bail and is spending
his time in jail with little or no chance to attempt a defense. If counsel finally appears in time for the trial, he often lacks the training and experience needed if he
is to be an effective advocate, as well as the time and resources to investigate the
facts of the case. These and many other facts leave no doubt that a great many,
probably the majority, of those accused of criminal acts lack the protections which
are presumably guaranteed by the federal constitution.
That justice and legality can never be safely taken for granted is an old and
familiar lesson, but one which is easily forgotten as long as we and ours are secure,
and isolated from those who are not. Trebach's book reminds us that realities
and democratic ideals are not synonymous at any point in our system - or any
other, for that matter - but the gap is particularly wide in regard to (1) protection
of the individual from arbitrary and illegal treatment by police, (2) effective
checks on the behavior of prosecutors, (3) availability of legal assistance to con1 Text at 81.
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victs, and (4) resources allocated to enforcement and resources available for
defense.
Among other important improvements the author suggests that what is really
needed is a "supervisor of rights" patterned after the ombudsman of Denmark
and similar offices in other Scandinavian nations.; Briefly, such an agency has full
authority to review and inspect the operations of every part of the legal system and
to initiate corrective measures, ranging from advisory discussions with those involved
to submission of investigative findings and proposed remedies directly to the
highest authority. Recognizing that there would be difficulties in adapting a
regulatory device developed in relatively small, homogeneous, centrally governed
nations to the needs of a large heterogeneous population with a federal system,
Trebach still believes that there "is no substantive reason why agencies with many
of the functions of the ombudsman could not be created in this country." 3 Unfortunately, the author's own book indicates that the difficulties may be far greater
than he appears willing to admit. The fact that federal constitutional rights do
not necessarily apply in non-federal cases is going to remain a fact as long as We
have any significant degree of state autonomy, despite decisions by the United
States Supreme Court. Lower state courts can still ignore such decisions in most
cases and expect to get away with it, especially when encouraged to do so by those
in control at the state and local levels. The realities of statism and localism indicate
that the facile notion of complementary sets of state and federal supervisors and
inspectors is dubious. To call a spade a spade, American history and Trebach's
evidence says that the federal government has been more effective in the protection
of individuals than have the state governments. Unless states, including Mississippi,
are transformed into something they have seldom or never been, there is little
chance that a federal-state system of ombudsmen with separate domains would make
much difference for the vast bulk of those who receive the punitive attention bf
the law. The implication, repugnant to most of us, is that a supervisory system
will work only to the extent that a single national office has the power of inspection
at every level of government. Repugnant or not, recent trends indicate that there
will be some such development at the expense of "state sovereignty" until and unless
each of the states at least equals the federal government in insuring the rights due
every individual according to our national ideology.
Not surprisingly, since the author is not a scientist, the weakest part of the
study is the amateurish simulation of scientific data collection. This reviewer was
especially unhappy with the performance precisely because he agrees with almost
every conclusion reached by the author. It is a disservice to any cause to leave
supporting research wide open to the charge of bias, and that is whathas happened
here. The plain fact is that without a semblance of random sampling nothing found
in the 359 questionnaires can be generalized. Thus, we actually have no data on
the range and frequencies of experienced injustices, no explicit and systematic
checks on the reliability and validity of the convicts' recall and perceptions of
their experiences, and no defensible data on federal-state differences in police,
courts, and penal conditions. Although "a few" 4 questions on the schedules were
open-ended, most were forced-choice. Since one does not know in most cases
whether a question was one or the other, an unfriendly critic could use the possibility of bias in the determination of which questions were to be forced-choice
and which open-ended to discredit the research. But the most serious deficiency
lies in the fact that the federal and state prisoners are clearly not comparable, at
least in one extremely important respect and possibly in others. A glance at the
distribution of offenses 5 shows that 60 percent of the 245 New Jersey prisoners
2 See

SAWER,

OMBUDSMEN

3 Text at 230.
4 Text at 238.
5 Text at 245.

(London: Cambridge University Press, 1964).
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were in for either homicide, robbery, rape and sex crimes, atrocious assault and
battery, or burglary, while none of the federal prisoners were in for such serious
crimes. Major offenders might reasonably be expected to have experienced less
considerate handling by law officers, and to exhibit somewhat more hostility toward
our legal institutions. 6 In addition, we do not know from the composite data 7
whether the federal convicts differed from the state prisoners significantly in regard
to education or occupational background. Nor do we know what might be the
significance of the fact that there were higher proportions of nonwhites in both the
state and federal samples than would have been expected from the official statistics
on the populations from which these samples were taken, or of the fact that the
discrepancy is much greater for the federal than for the state prisoners. It could
be important, too, that there was no breakdown by "federal" and "state" of the
responses to such questions as those asking about knowledge of legal rights,8
assignment of counsel, 9 and prosecution-defense negotiations, 10 although breakdowns were given for questions relating to police behavior"- and to prison conditions.' 2 In short, poor methodology has wasted a beautiful opportunity to reinforce
with hard data conclusions arrived at by legal, journalistic, and commonsensical
analysis.
Any reviewer has the duty of ferreting out the defects in a publication, even
when he is fully in sympathy with the author's objectives and conclusions. This time
the duty has been painful. Despite the failure of the prisoner questionnaires to
provide more than illustrative and suggestive data, the book on the whole will
be a very useful and readable quick reference for those who are concerned with
the problems of American justice but have not the time to study these problems
thoroughly.
Austin T. Turk*

TiE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: SUMMARY AND COMMENT. By Daniel J. Baum.
New York: Syracuse University Press, 1964. Pp. xviii, 167. $5.75. - A society dedicated to the proposition that the production and distribution of goods and services
should, in the main, be left to the initiative of private individuals and groups, must
of necessity "arrive at prescriptions and proscriptions designed to keep the processes
thus unleashed from interfering with the attainment of the fundamental goals
and aspirations of the community and, ultimately, from destroying the legal framework in which they operate."' Few would question the part played by laissez-faire
concepts in the dramatic growth and development of the economic superstructure
of our society. But times change, and with them the conditions out of which are
derived the political and social theories designed for their rationalization and
service. Such theories, however, institutionalized in the womb of time, often survive
the conditions from which they were generated and assume an independent existence. Exhibiting a tenacity to life as formidable as any attributed by the psychologists to man himself, the old bottles - to use Toynbee's metaphor - of institu6 There is research evidence suggesting that such is the case. See, e.g., Mylonas and
Reckless, Prisoners' Attitudes Toward Law and Legal Institutions, 54 J. CRIM. L., 0. & P. S.
479, 482 (Table 1) (1963).
7 Text at 246.
8 Text at 250, 258.
9 Text at 259.
10 Text at 260-61.
11 Text at 250-57, 262-63.
12 Text at 264.
* Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Indiana University.
1 Riesenfeld, Book Review of RowE, PRcIE
AcT, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 915 (1962).

PATMAN

DISCRIMINATION

UNDER

THE" ROBINSON-

BOOK REVIEWS
tionalized 2theory endeavor desperately to contain the new wine of different social
conditions.

Historically, however, the "unseen hand" simply proved ineffective as the sole
regulator of economic life in this country. Business growth in the latter years of
the last century meant power, and power meant the opportunity for abuse.3 Further,
new social demands were made and new political goals were fashionedin response.
As society became more complex and pluralistic, competing and often contradictory,
values had to be assessed one against the other.4 Thus, the farmers' demand in the
1870's for an end to railroad rebates and long-haul/short-haul price discriminations
had to be weighed against the freedom of the railroads to operate their businesses
as they saw fit. The resolution of the problems of competing values and demands
and of the pressure which they inevitably imposed upon the framework of our free
society, called for a great deal of ingenuity. And, ingenuity there was -"ingenuity
in the development of pragmatic solutions to problems." 5 This, indeed, was the
origin of our antitrust and trade regulation laws. "The extremists who called for
a complete laissez-faire approach, a sort of economic law of the jungle, were
wisely defeated. Those, on the other hand, who called for outright federal ownership and control have never succeeded. A balance was struck, resulting in the
growth of economic individualism and the fostering of free and fair competition." 6
As ingenious as the solution has proven to be, however, all did not end with
the 1890 Act.7 New conditions continued to generate new problems, and new
problems brought new laws.' The pragmatic American approach to legislation
of meeting new needs as they arise with specific new or amendatory statutes is
not without its problems. In responding only to specific measures and needs as
they arise, the law may seem to grow like Topsy, resulting in what may often appear
to be an illogical and incoherent quagmire of specific prescriptions and proscriptions only generally related and often contradictory.
Of all the provisions of the antitrust laws, the one most vulnerable to this
criticism has proven to be the Robinson-Patman ActY As summarized recently
by a leading commentator:
Twenty-six years after its enactment the Robinson-Patman Act remains
as the most controversial of all the statutes labelled "antitrust laws." The
classification of the statutory prohibition of price and service discrimination
as "antitrust" legislation has long been seriously questioned and criticism of
the act has mushroomed until it is exceedingly difficult today to find an ardent defender among academicians or other objective observers. Inept draftsmanship, erroneous basic precepts, class protectionism, and inconsistency with
Sherman Act policies are among the many fundamental faults found with
the legislation itself. Confusion in interpretation, vacillation in policies, lack
of guiding strategy in enforcement (or misguided strategy) and failure to
perceive the need for harmonizing its interpretations with Sherman Act
policies stand out as some of the
more cogent criticisms of the enforcement
and administration of the act.' 0

2

Cf. Nichols, "Federalism versus Democracy," in

50-51 (1942).

FabERasLsM AS A DEMOCRATiC PROCESS

3 See generally JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS (1934).
4 Even the dean of American laissez-fairers, Professor Jacob Vinar, has recently acknowledged that modem society cannot forego providing for "other ingredients of the good life not
consistent with laissez-faire." Vinar, The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire, 3 J. L. & EcON.
45 (1960).
5 KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PIMER 15 (1964).
6 Ibid.
7 The Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S. Code, §§ 1-8.
8 E.g., the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended, 15 U.S. CODE, §§ 12-27, 29 U.S. Code,
§ 52; the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717, as amended, 15 U.S. Code, §§ 41-58;
the Robinson-Patnan Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S. Code, §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a.
9 Ibid.
10 Weston, Book Review of Rows, Psucn DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
AcT, 60 MicH. L. REv. 1020 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
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There can be little doubt but that the Robinson-Patman Act is controversial
and complex. That criticisms are plentiful, however, is not to suggest its repeal.
The act, just as all the other antitrust laws, was a response to a definite need,
i.e., to place some curb on the power of large buying groups, particularly the chain
grocery stores. Extensive investigation had shown that chain grocery stores were
able to secure favored pricing treatment from suppliers by virtue of their largevolume purchases. Price reductions to chain stores were reflected in a lower retail
price to the consumer, thus placing the independent grocery stores in an unfavorable
competitive condition. There resulted broad public support for legislation which
would compel suppliers to treat all buyers on a fair and equal basis in order that
the small independents would not be prejudiced by their lack of purchasing power. 1
Further, the act has proven impervious to amendment. It must thus be recognized that though defects abound, the definite need which prompted its passage
is still "felt" at least to the extent that a broad consensus supports its two primary
objects:
1. To prevent unscrupulous suppliers from attempting to gain an unfair
advantage over their competitors by discriminating among buyers; and
2. To prevent unscrupulous buyers from using their economic power
to exact discriminatory
prices from suppliers to the disadvantage of less
2
powerful buyers.'
If the act is thus to remain with us regardless of criticisms of inept draftsmanship, erroneous basic precepts, inconsistency with Sherman Act policies, etc., at
the least it might be made more orderly and understandable. The tremendous
amount of precedent which has developed around the act i3 is a step in this direction. To be meaningful, however, as a basis of predictability the numerous FTC
complaints and orders, as well as Justice Department cases and private actions,
must be synthesized and clarified. Professor Baum's book, The Robinson-Patman
Act: Summary
& Comment, is the most recent effort in a series of works directed
4
to this end.1

Professor Baum's little book, which numbers only 167 pages, is not, nor does
it purport to be, an exhaustive scholarly treatise in the mold of Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act, which when added to the 1964
supplement comprises 860 pages. It is purely and simply a "summary and comment."' 5 Concise and readable, Professor Baum's book has utility "for the law
student and the business student as well as the general practitioner and the antitrust specialist."' 6 In accomplishing the objective as stated, Professor Baum has
performed a singular service to antitrust literature.
Appropriately, the first four chapters deal with the provisions of the RobinsonPatman Act itself, i.e., price discrimination (§ (2a)), meeting competition (§ 2(b) ),
brokerage (§ 2(c)), merchandising allowances (§§ 2(d), 2 (e)), and inducing a
discriminatory price (§ 2(f) ). In each, the statutory language is analyzed, the caselaw discussed, and a commentary calls attention to the remaining and resulting
problems. Also included are short chapters on unreasonably low prices (§ 3),.
unfair methods of competition (§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act), combinations in restraint of trade (§ 1 of the Sherman Act), and orders under the
Robinson-Patman Act. Finally, and probably most enlightening is the chapter on
11

KINTNER, supra note 5, at 59-60.
12 Id. at 60.
13 Weston, supra note 10.
14 Other such works include RowE, Pi E DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT (1962), and the 1964 Supplement; EDwARDS, THE PRiuc DiSCRIMNATION LAW (1959);
and the Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
155-221 (1955).
15 Text at vii.
16 Ibid.
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the relationship between the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in selecting cases. There are also a number of valuable appendices.
In his selection of materials from the plethora of Robinson-Patman cases and
writings, and in the organization of his presentation, Professor Baum's careful and
informal analysis will be a valuable reference tool for any serious antitrust student
or practitioner interested in this much-maligned but little understood Federal law.
His sympathetic, but fair and realistic treatment, constitutes a vital step in bringing
order and understanding to this complex and confusing area of the law.
Earl W. Kintner*

*

Partner, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D.C.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Having problems involving corporate payments to widows
or the sales tax trust in a bankruptcy proceeding against
the merchant-trustee? If the answer is yes, you likely would
find invaluable the notes on these topics in the Winter
Issue of the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL. In addition, the
Winter Issue will feature an article by Spencer L. Kimball
and Werner Pfennigstorf on the administrative control of
insurance contracts and an article by Edmund W. Kitch on
section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code.
Notes on townhouse owners' associations, municipal labor
law ordinances, judicial termination of parental rights, strict
liability for blasting-vibration damage, direct subdivision
control by municipalities, and other topics of current practical and academic interest are planned for later issues.
You can get all of the issues in Volume 40 by mailing in
your subscription now. The rates are $5 for one year; $13
for three years; or $20 for five years. Single issues are $1.50.
Mail your check to:

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Indiana University School of Law
Bloomington, Indiana

